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THE FIGHT GOES ON FOREVER: “LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT” AND THE FIRST BANK OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Michael Coblenz* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Hearing conservative politicians and jurists argue that the “Framers” or 
the “Founders” wanted limited government always makes me wonder who 
they are talking about.1  One of the first acts of the first Congress was to 
create a national bank, a bank that soon became the largest commercial 
enterprise in the nation.  This, to me, does not sound like men who believed 
in limited government. 
The issue arose most recently with the debate over the Affordable Care 
Act (“ACA”),2 often derided by its opponents as “Obamacare.”  The 
rhetorical and legal challenges to the ACA were based almost entirely on the 
idea that Congress lacked the authority to enact many of the provisions of the 
ACA under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and specifically the so-
called “individual mandate” that required all individuals to obtain health 
insurance.  The substance of the ACA was upheld by the Supreme Court 
under the taxing authority,3 but in the dissent the four most conservative 
justices, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, and Anthony 
Kennedy, asserted that the ACA exceeded the enumerated powers of 
Congress.  The dissenters noted that in recent years the Supreme Court found 
limits to the power of Congress, specifically with regards to the regulation of 
commerce:  
In United States v. Lopez, we held that Congress could not, as a means of 
fostering an educated interstate labor market through the protection of 
schools, ban the possession of a firearm within a school zone.  And in 
United States v. Morrison, we held that Congress could not, in an effort to 
                                                                                                                           
* Michael Coblenz is an intellectual property attorney in Lexington, Kentucky.  He received his J.D. 
from Gonzaga University School of Law, an LL.M. from the University of Houston Law Center, 
and an MA in American History from Eastern Washington University.   
1. Framers are the men who drafted, or framed, the Constitution at the Philadelphia Convention in 
1787.  Founders are a broader group which not only includes the framers, but also prominent men 
involved in the creation, or founding, of the nation from the earliest colonial times through the 
ratification of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson, for example, was a founder but not a framer.   
2. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119–1025 (2010). 
3. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2595 (2012). 
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ensure the full participation of women in the interstate economy, subject 
private individuals and companies to suit for gender motivated violent 
torts.4  
The dissent explained that: 
[the] lesson of these cases is that the Commerce Clause, even when 
supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for 
doing whatever will help achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation 
of commerce. And the last two of these cases show that the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is exceeded not only when the congressional 
action directly violates the sovereignty of the States but also when it violates 
the background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power.5  
Throughout these cases, and specifically in the ACA case, 
conservatives on the Supreme Court often refer to Madison’s views on the 
limits of governmental power. As Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito said in their dissent: “As for the constitutional power to tax and spend 
for the general welfare: The Court has long since expanded that beyond (what 
Madison thought it meant) taxing and spending for those aspects of the 
general welfare that were within the Federal Government’s enumerated 
powers.”6  
Justice Thomas filed a short dissent in the ACA case agreeing that the 
“Individual Mandate is beyond the power granted to Congress under the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.”7 He then said that 
the modern interpretation of the “Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the 
original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early 
Commerce Clause cases.”8 He referred to his more lengthy analysis of that 
topic in his concurrence in the case of United States v. Lopez, where he said:  
We start with first principles.  The Constitution creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers.  See Art. I, § 8.  As James Madison 
wrote: “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-
293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  This constitutionally mandated division of 
                                                                                                                           
4. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Buss. 132 S. Ct. at 2646 (internal citations omitted, but citing United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559–63 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609–19 
(2000)).  
5. Id.  
6. Id. at 2643 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936)). 
7. Id. at 2677. 
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.  
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authority “was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our 
fundamental liberties.”  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).  Just 
as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power 
in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the 
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front.9 
Thomas, and conservatives on and off the bench, assert that the framers’ 
intent was to create a government with strictly limited and enumerated 
power.  The creation of the First Bank of the United States, by the First 
Congress, seems to throw that idea for a loop.  The First Bank was more than 
just a bank—a depository of money and a commercial lending institution—
it was the largest single commercial enterprise in the nation.10  So the First 
Congress, with many Framers as members, created a government owned 
business, which became the largest single commercial enterprise in the 
nation.  
Conservatives frequently quote James Madison as though he is an 
oracle, and the sole source of wisdom regarding what the framers intended. 
But what if some “framers” didn’t agree with Madison?  What if more 
“framers” supported the Bank of the United States, and Alexander 
Hamilton’s more expansive view of Congressional power than Madison’s 
views of limited powers?  What does it say about the framers’ belief in 
“enumerated powers” and “limited government” when a majority of the 
“framers” in the First Congress rejected Madison’s views?  This Article will 
address these questions.  
The issue involves the meaning of the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the interplay between the two.  These 
issues arose during the Constitutional Convention, and were discussed during 
the ratification process.  These arguments are described in the first section. 
The second section details the debate in the First Congress over the Bank of 
the United States, and describes how Congressmen and “framers” interpreted 
these two clauses.  The Bank Bill then went to President Washington for his 
signature, and Washington sought the advice of his senior advisers. Their 
analysis is outlined in the third section.  The final section tallies which 
framers supported the Bank, and an expansive view of the powers of 
Congress, versus the framers who opposed the Bank, and therefore wanted 
to restrict the powers of Congress.  Notably, twice as many framers in the 
first government supported the Bank as opposed it.  
                                                                                                                           
9. Id. at 552 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)).  
10. DAVID JACK COWEN, THE ORIGINS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1791–1797, at xxiv (2000).   
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II.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE POWER OF CONGRESS 
A.  Introduction 
 The First Bank of the United States was part of Treasury Secretary 
Alexander Hamilton’s attempt to turn the United States into a mercantile 
nation to rival Great Britain.  Hamilton proposed the First Bank during the 
first Congress, but he had long hoped that the new nation would be a 
mercantile power on par with England.11  Hamilton knew, however, that the 
new nation would not rival England’s mercantile power due to the chaotic 
and unorganized state of the nation under the Articles of Confederation.12  A 
number of other prominent men, including James Madison and George 
Washington, were also concerned about the chaotic state of the nascent 
nation.13  States were in open conflict over borders and commercial issues 
including imports and tariffs.14  In the fall of 1786, Hamilton and Madison 
met with a group of like-minded individuals at Annapolis, Maryland, to 
discuss the inability of the Government under the Articles of Confederation 
to deal with these issues.15  The Report from the Annapolis Conference noted 
that the delegates met  
to take into consideration the trade and Commerce of the United States, to 
consider how far an uniform system in their commercial intercourse and 
regulations might be necessary to their common interest and permanent 
harmony, and to report to the several States such an Act, relative to this 
great object.16  
The delegates were not able to reach an agreement at Annapolis, so they 
proposed a subsequent meeting, tentatively scheduled for the following 
summer in Philadelphia, to discuss amending the Articles of Incorporation 
“to render the constitution of the Federal government adequate to the 
exigencies of the Union.”17  It was common knowledge that “the exigencies 
                                                                                                                           
11. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 344–49 (2004).  
12. Id.  
13. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 5–8 (1966).   
14. Id. at 6–7. 
15. Id. at 8–10.  
16. PROCEEDINGS OF COMMISSIONERS TO REMEDY DEFECTS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1786), 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp#1. 
17. Id.  
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of the Union” involved the various problems with trade and the commercial 
relations between the states.18   
B.  The Purpose of the Constitutional Convention 
Although one of the main purposes of the Constitutional Convention 
was to address the ability of the government to regulate commerce,19 there is 
relatively little discussion of commercial issues in the record we have of the 
Convention.20  There are many possible reasons for this.  Perhaps the framers 
understood that the purpose of the new government was to actively engage 
in the regulation of commercial matters between the states, and so the issue 
warranted little discussion.  Another possible reason is that the Framers 
actively debated the issue outside of the Convention, but with the limited 
surviving record we cannot say. 
The lack of a record was by design.  At the beginning of the Convention 
the delegates were sworn to secrecy;21 the purpose was to allow the delegates 
to speak freely, and to prevent details from leaking out and generating public 
discussion and potential opposition before the work was done.  The purpose 
was not to prevent later generations from learning about the “intent” of the 
framers, but that was the effect, at least until Madison’s notes were published 
in 1840.22  Because of this rule there is a very limited record of the 
proceedings.  There was an official record of topics and speakers, but no 
official transcript of discussions.  A few other delegates took notes, including 
Hamilton, Rufus King, William Pierce, James McHenry, William Paterson, 
and Robert Yates, but these were cursory and incomplete.  The most detailed 
notes were compiled by James Madison.23  
 
 
                                                                                                                           
18. CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 42–43 (1986).  
19. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 6–11.  
20. The record is limited to the Official Journal, and notes of a number of Delegates, including James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Rufus King, William Pierce, James McHenry, William Paterson, 
and Robert Yates. Madison’s notes are the most extensive and generally considered the best record 
of the Convention. These notes are available on-line at numerous sources, perhaps the best is Yale 
University’s Avalon Project: Notes on the Debates in the Federal Convention,  
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). The Journal and notes are collected in, MAX 
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1996).  
21. COLLIER, supra note 18, at 113–14; see also James Madison’s Notes On the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787, Tuesday, May 29, 1787, NAT’L HERITAGE CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
STUDIES, http://www.nhccs.org/dfc-0529.txt (last visited Mar. 31, 2015). 
22. JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (W.W. Norton, 
1987) (1840).  Note some of the other’s notes were published soon thereafter.  
23. The notes of the debates and the official record are collated in FARRAND, supra note 20.  
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B.  Enumerated Powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
The Virginia Plan, written by James Madison and Edmund Randolph, 
and presented at the Convention by Randolph on May 29, was the framework 
for much of the debate over the form of the new government.24  The plan set 
out a list of fifteen “resolutions” regarding the form of a new nation.25  The 
Sixth Resolution set out the powers of the proposed National Legislature, and 
said that it  
shall have the power to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws 
passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National 
Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union 
against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles 
thereof.26 
Essentially Madison’s proposal was that the national legislature would 
have all powers not held by the states, which is the broadest possible degree 
of power.  This was initially approved, but as the balance of power shifted 
among the states, particularly regarding the make-up of the two chambers of 
the legislature, the issue was readdressed.  When the Committee of Detail 
was appointed to create a draft constitution for discussion, they took it upon 
themselves to set out a list of specifically enumerated Congressional 
powers.27  When the Convention discussed the draft and the specifically 
enumerated powers, they debated whether specific provisions should be set 
out or if particular matters fell under the general grant of authority to the 
government.28  On August 18, Madison proposed a list of specifically 
enumerated powers, which included the power “to grant charters of 
incorporation where the public good may require them.”29  Charles Pinkney 
proposed his own list, which also included the power to “grant charters of 
                                                                                                                           
24. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 38; see also ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING 
FATHER 15 (1987).  
25. The Virginia Plan is available on-line at the Yale Avalon History web site.  See Variant Texts of the 
Virginia Plan, Presented by Edmund Randolph to the Federal Convention, May 29, 1787.  Text A, 
LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/vatexta.asp (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
26. Id. 
27. COLLIER, supra note 18, at 190. 
28.  Id. at 190–91. 
29. Madison Debates August 18, LILLIAN GOLDMAN LAW LIBRARY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 
18th_century/debates_818.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
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incorporation.”30  This specific provision, along with a number of others, was 
eventually removed.31  The record of the debate does not indicate whether it 
was removed because the delegates did not want to grant that power to 
Congress (Madison’s suggested view), or because they considered it a 
general power that the national government would inherently have, and 
therefore need not be set out in the Constitution.   
The Committee of Detail also included a version of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.32  As details of a specific list of powers was debated, the 
verbiage of the Necessary and Proper Clause was tweaked, but the substance 
of this provision was not subject to any recorded debate.  It was modified 
only slightly by the Committee on Style and ended up in the final document.33  
The final version of the Constitution gives Congress the power to 
regulate commerce between the states, and internationally,34 but it also 
contains the “necessary and proper clause,” which seems to expand the 
specifically delineated powers of Congress.  
While there was little specific debate over the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, there were a number of delegates who objected to the clause because 
they thought that it expanded the powers of Congress to regulate almost 
anything, so long as they could conceivably state that it was “necessary” or 
“proper.”  The chief opponent was George Mason of Virginia.  Mason raised 
his objections in only a cursory manner at the end of the convention when he 
explained why he refused to sign the final document,35 but he circulated a 
letter afterwards, which described his objections.36  His primary complaint 
was the lack of a Bill of Rights, but he also noted the potential problems 
created by the Necessary and Proper Clause.37  His letter became the basis 
for a number of attacks on the Constitution regarding what Mason derisively 
called “the sweeping clause” because it swept up all powers to the federal 
government.38   
                                                                                                                           
30. Id.  
31.  COLLIER, supra note 18, at 190–91. 
32.  Id. at 190. 
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department of Officer thereof.”).   
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states, and with the Indian tribes.”).  
35. COLLIER, supra note 15, at 255.  Mason’s primary opposition over the lack a bill of rights.  
36. See infra text accompanying note 34.  
37.  GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE 
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in MERRILL JENSEN, ET AL., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION [hereinafter “DHRC”] 348–51 (1976). 
38. Id.   
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D.  Ratification and the Powers of Congress 
After the document was signed on September 17, 1789, it was sent to 
the Congress of the Confederation, and to the thirteen state capitals for 
ratification.39  The proposed Constitution was the subject of almost 
immediate discussion and the subject of numerous essays and articles in the 
newspapers across the country.  Some of the first to write were the opponents, 
who eventually became known as the “Anti-Federalists.”40  
1.  The “Anti-Federalists” 
George Mason’s letter was one of the first to critique the Constitution, 
and it became the basis for a number of subsequent objections.  Among his 
other objections, Mason complained about the “necessary and proper” 
clause, which he derided as the “sweeping clause.”41  The danger of this 
provision, he said, was that:  
Under their own construction of the general clause, at the end of the 
enumerated powers, the Congress may . . . extend their powers as far as they 
shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the 
powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.42 
Barely a month after the close of the Constitutional Convention, another 
skeptic of the new document, who called himself “Brutus,” voiced his 
objection to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which he termed the “elastic 
clause,” in an essay published in a New York paper in October 1787. 
This government is to possess absolute and uncontrollable power, 
legislative, executive and judicial, with respect to every object to which it 
extends, [because one clause] declared “that the Congress shall have power 
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this 
                                                                                                                           
39. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 263–68.  Note, there were numerous “congresses” in the early nation, 
and they often went by similar names.  For clarity’s sake I will refer to the Congress of the colonies 
during the Revolution and before the creation of the Articles of Confederation as the Continental 
Congress.  I will refer to the Congress that met and governed under the Articles of Confederation 
as the Congress of the Confederation, and later during the debate over the Bank Bill I will refer to 
the newly elected Congress as the First Congress.   
40. BOWEN, supra note 13, at 268.  
41.  Id.  
42. GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE 
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in DHRC, supra note 37, at 348–51, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/gmason/objections.html.  
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constitution, in the government of the United States; or in any department 
or office thereof.”  
. . . . 
A power to make all laws, which shall be necessary and proper, . . . is a 
power very comprehensive and definite, and may, for ought I know, be 
exercised in a such manner as entirely to abolish the state legislatures, . . .   
annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country to one single 
government.43 
Another complaint about this provision is that the clause leaves it to 
Congress to decide what was necessary and proper.  This was the argument 
of the “Old Whig,” writing in Philadelphia in October 1787:  
Under such a clause as this can any thing be said to be reserved and kept 
back from Congress?  Can it be said that the Congress have no power but 
what is expressed.  “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper” 
is in other words to make all such laws which the Congress shall think 
necessary and proper, — for who shall judge for the legislature what is 
necessary and proper? — Who shall set themselves above the sovereign? 
— What inferior legislature shall set itself above the supreme legislature? 
To me it appears that no other power on earth can dictate to them or control 
them, unless by force. 
  Where then is the restraint?  How are Congress bound down to the 
powers expressly given? What is reserved or can be reserved?44 
2.  The Federalists 
Hamilton read these and other critical essays with concern.  He 
published a few essays in support of the Constitution, but decided that a more 
organized response was needed.45  He discussed the matter with a number of 
Framers, but eventually only John Jay and James Madison committed to 
producing a series of essays.46  They produced a total of eighty-five essays, 
but only a handful specifically dealt with the powers of Congress and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.47  
The authors of the Federalists were in a tough spot.  On one hand they 
had to convince some people that the new government would be more 
                                                                                                                           
43. “Brutus,” published in the New York Journal, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 271–75 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986); 
see also DHRC, supra note 37, at vol. VIII, 412–21, at 413–14.  This was the first of three essays 
by Brutus.  
44. The Old Whig 2, reprinted in DHRC, supra note 37, at 402-03; see also THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1971), available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/ 
library/index.asp?document=1937.  
45.  CHERNOW, supra note 11, at 243–46. 
46.  Id. at 246–47.  
47. Id. at 246–49.  
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effective, and hence have more power, than the government under the 
Articles of Confederation.  But at the same time they had to convince the 
skeptics, typified by the Anti-Federalists, that the new government was not 
overly powerful.  The result was that at times the Federalists seem like they 
were trying to have it both ways.     
Modern conservatives like to quote Madison from Federalist No. 45:  
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal 
government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite.”48  
But there are a number of other essays that deal with the scope of 
Congressional power and the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The first was 
Federalist No. 23, written by Alexander Hamilton, and published on 
December 21, 1787. 
Hamilton first addressed the power of Congress to enact laws relating 
to the common defense.  He said that these powers: 
[O]ught to exist without limitation, BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO 
FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY OF NATIONAL 
EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY 
OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. 
The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for 
this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power 
to which the care of it is committed . . . .49   
But this broad grant of authority is not just necessary for matters of 
national defense, it is necessary for all matters under Congressional authority, 
including commerce.  “The same must be the case in respect to commerce, 
and to every other matter to which its [Congress] jurisdiction is permitted to 
extend.”50  This, according to Hamilton, is necessary for a competent 
government. 51  
Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end, 
would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and 
improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are 
disabled from managing them with vigor and success . . . . A government, 
the constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers 
which a free people OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT, 
                                                                                                                           
48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 260 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).   
49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 121 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis in 
original).  
50.  Id. at 123.   
51. Id. at 124 (emphasis in original).  
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would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL 
INTERESTS.52  
In Federalist No. 33, published on January 3, 1788, Hamilton discussed 
the powers of taxation, and attempted to explain that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause did not expand this to render the power to tax absolute.53  He 
noted that there had been complaints about this provision by opponents of 
the Constitution.54  He did not identify them, but it seems likely that he was 
referring to the “Brutus” and the “Old Whig,” among others.  He then said 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause was “only declaratory of a truth which 
would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very 
act of constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain specified 
powers.”55   
Hamilton explained the purpose of the clause with a bit of conclusory 
logic:  
What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing?  What is the 
ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the MEANS necessary to 
its execution?  What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but a power of making 
LAWS?  What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE power but 
LAWS?  What is the power of laying and collecting taxes, but a 
LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and 
collect taxes?  What are the proper means of executing such a power, but 
NECESSARY and PROPER laws?56   
He then addressed the question, raised by “The Old Whig,” of who decided 
what is necessary and proper?  
Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and PROPRIETY of the laws . . . [The] 
national government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of 
the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last. If the 
federal government should overpass the just bounds of its authority and 
make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose creature it is, must 
appeal to the standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress 
the injury done to the Constitution as the exigency may suggest and 
prudence justify.57 
                                                                                                                           
52. Id. at 124 (emphasis in original).  
53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 169–73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).    
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 170 (emphasis in original).  
56. Id.  
57. Id. at 171.  
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So Congress can be its own judge of what is necessary and proper, but 
ultimately the members of Congress must stand for election, and if the public 
disagrees with what Congress has done, they can remove those 
representatives and elect new ones more in line with their thinking.  
A few weeks later, Madison set out the most specific and detailed 
analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as a broad overview of 
the scope of federal powers, in Federalist No. 44.  No. 44 is the continuation 
of a series starting with No. 41, which goes through, point by point, the 
powers of the Federal Government.  The main thrust of these essays is how 
the Constitution actually limits the national power by clearly delineating the 
various things that the government can do.  After setting out all of the powers 
under various provisions of the Constitution, including an extensive 
explanation of the powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, 
Madison addressed the Necessary and Proper Clause.58  He noted that “Few 
parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more intemperance than 
this,”59 but he proclaimed that “[w]ithout the SUBSTANCE of this power, 
the whole Constitution would be a dead letter.”60  Since the substance is 
necessary, he then asked how the Constitution could have expressed this 
grant of authority.61  Madison suggested that there are basically four 
“methods which the Constitution might have taken on this subject.”62  First, 
the framers “might have copied the second article of the existing 
Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any power not 
EXPRESSLY delegated.”63 
Had the convention [done this] it is evident that the new Congress would be 
continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of 
construing the term “EXPRESSLY” with so much rigor as to disarm the 
government of all real authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to 
destroy altogether the force of the restriction.64 
In other words, the fight would have been over the meaning of the 
concept of “expressed” powers.  This possibility was discussed and rejected 
at the Constitutional Convention.  As noted, the Articles of Confederation 
were widely considered ineffectual in large measure because the central 
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government lacked sufficient powers to deal with national matters, and the 
framers wanted a more able government.   
Second, the framers “might have attempted a positive enumeration of 
the powers comprehended under the general terms ‘necessary and proper.’”65 
Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers 
necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt 
would have involved a complete digest of laws on every subject to which 
the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing state of 
things, but to all the possible changes which futurity may produce; for in 
every new application of a general power, the PARTICULAR POWERS, 
which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of the general power, must 
always necessarily vary with that object, and be often properly varied whilst 
the object remains the same.66 
This too was discussed at the Convention.  At one point both Madison 
and Charles Pinckney attempted to draw up lists of specifically delegated 
powers, but it became obvious that this was unworkable, and was rejected.67   
Third, the framers “might have attempted a negative enumeration . . . 
by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition.”68  
Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means not 
necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task 
would have been no less chimerical [that listing granted powers]; and would 
have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in the 
enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of authority.69  
In other words anything not prohibited would have been assumed 
allowed.  This was not specifically discussed at the Convention, but Madison 
likely sets it out to show that it too would be unworkable.   
Fourth, “they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving 
these necessary and proper powers to construction and inference.”70 
Had the Constitution been silent on this head [as it was], there can be no 
doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing the 
general powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidable 
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implication.  No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than 
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever a 
general power to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for 
doing it is included.71    
Madison stole a march on potential critics by asking, hypothetically, 
what the consequence would be if Congress overreached and exerted powers 
not authorized: 
I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power 
vested in them; . . . In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will 
depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to expound 
and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must 
be obtained from the people who can, by the election of more faithful 
representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers.72  
In other words, the president and the judiciary would serve as a check 
on Congressional power, and ultimately, if the people objected they could 
elect new representatives.  
In Federalist No. 45, Madison discussed the apportionment of power 
between the states and the federal government.  He was apparently 
addressing the Anti-Federalist argument that the federal government overly 
encroached upon the state governments, and perhaps even supplanted them.73 
He began the essay by reviewing the history of some other confederations 
and noted that in most cases the general government failed not because it 
assumed too much power but because of encroachment of powers by the 
state.74  Then he noted that under the system proposed by the Constitution 
the federal government is largely controlled by the states.75  First the elected 
members of the federal government are largely beholden to the states.76  The 
President, he noted, cannot be elected “without the intervention of the State 
legislatures,” Senators are selected by the state legislatures, and 
Representatives, while elected by the people, “will be chosen very much 
under the influence of that class of men” who are in the state legislatures.77 
He then noted that the federal government will have relatively few employees 
when compared to the state governments.78  He described tax collectors, 
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justices of the peace, militia officers and the like.79  It is when describing the 
various government employees that he noted that the “powers delegated by 
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. 
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite.”80  The main power of the federal government would be to deal 
with war and peace, while the states would be left to deal with “the ordinary 
course of affairs, concerning the lives, liberties, and properties of the 
people.”81   
Madison and Hamilton wrote another forty essays, and the Federalists 
were important in defining the scope of the Constitution for the delegates to 
the ratifying conventions and convincing enough of them to eventually ratify 
the Constitution.  One of the complaints of the opponents was the lack of a 
Bill of Rights to protect individual rights, and a number of states ratified with 
the condition that a Bill of Rights be added to the Constitution.82  A number 
of states included proposed amendments in their ratification documents.83 
New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in June of 1788, 
which meant that it could take effect, and Virginia and New York 
subsequently ratified.84  Elections were held in late 1788, and the first 
government under the Constitution was sworn-in in January 1789.  Then the 
First Congress began the difficult task of putting the Constitution into effect 
and creating a working national government.  There were a number of 
arguments over the scope of the powers of Congress and the Government 
during the First Congress, but the most detailed and illuminating involved 
Alexander Hamilton’s plan for a National Bank.  
III.  THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE POWERS 
OF CONGRESS 
The Constitution created a rough outline for a new government, but it 
fell to the First Congress to create the institutions of a working government. 
The First Congress established the Judiciary, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Department of War, they selected the site for the new national capital 
(spoiler alert: they picked a location on the Potomac) and established 
provisions for the Federal assumption of the states’ Revolutionary War 
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debts.85  The First Congress also created a Treasury Department,86 and 
President Washington appointed his friend and former aide-de-camp, 
Alexander Hamilton, as the first Secretary of the Treasury.87  Hamilton 
wanted to transform the new nation into a mercantile power to rival 
England.88  In early 1790, Hamilton submitted his “First Report on the Public 
Credit” to Congress, which was the first part of his plan, and described the 
nation’s finances in general and government finances in particular, and 
suggested that the national government assume the state debts acquired to 
fight the Revolutionary War.89  This issue was the subject of heated debate 
throughout the year, but Congress eventually agreed that the federal 
government would assume the war debt.90  On December 23, 1790, Hamilton 
submitted his “Report on a National Bank” to Congress, which included a 
proposal for the establishment of a national bank.91   
The Report again addressed the financial problems facing the new 
nation and government, and explained how a national bank would help deal 
with many of these problems.92  The Report did not specifically address 
whether Congress had the authority to establish a bank, but did note that a 
bank would assist the nation in levying and collecting taxes, borrowing 
money, and raising and supplying an army and navy93  The Report 
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A.  The Senate Enacts a Bank Charter Bill 
The Senate officially received Hamilton’s report on December 23, 
1790, and appointed a committee to evaluate it, and draft a Senate version of 
the Bill.  The committee was made up of Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, 
Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, Philip Schuyler of New York, Pierce Butler 
of South Carolina, and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut.  Strong, Morris, 
Butler, and Ellsworth were all at the Constitutional Convention (and were, 
therefore “framers”), and all except Butler ultimately supported the Bank 
Bill.  On January 3, 1791, the Committee presented the Senate with their 
version of the Bill.  The Senate Bill was nearly identical in substance to 
Hamilton’s Bill, but with provisions numbered and reordered slightly.95  The 
Committee, made up of four “framers,” raised no concerns about the ability 
of Congress to create a national bank under the Constitution.  While we do 
not know, because of the limited record, we can assume based on the debate 
in the House that followed, that they simply assumed that the new 
government had that power.96    
The Bill was given two readings before substantive debate began on 
January 13, 1791.97  The first substantive issue involved the duration of the 
Bank.98  Hamilton’s proposal, adopted by the committee, was for the Bank 
to exist as long as the national debt existed.99  There was a motion to limit 
the term of incorporation to seven years.100  This was debated without any 
record of a vote, and a second motion was made for the charter to terminate 
on March 4, 1815.101  This motion passed, without record of the votes.102  A 
subsequent motion was made to allow unlimited duration, but with a 
provision that the charter could be terminated at any time with a twelve 
month notice.103  This was debated and rejected.104  A motion was made to 
limit the charter to March 4, 1811.105  While this was being debated a 
subsequent motion was made to limit the charter to March 4, 1801.106  This 
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vote was recorded, and the motion was defeated sixteen to six.107  The six 
voting to strictly limit the duration of the Bank Charter were Pierce Butler 
and Ralph Izard of South Carolina, William Few and James Gunn of Georgia, 
Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina, and James Monroe of Virginia.108 
Both Butler and Few were framers.  It is notable that while no Senator 
questioned the constitutionality of the Bill, those who objected were all from 
the South.  With this vote the charter was granted until March 4, 1811.109 
The next matter, discussed only briefly, was the removal of a section 
that would prevent the chartering of any other bank, thereby granting a 
monopoly to the National Bank.110  This was rejected by a vote of eighteen 
to five.  The five opposed were Butler, Few, Hawkins, Izard, and Monroe, 
five of the six men who supported a strict time limit on the Bank.  This was 
the last proposed amendment to the Bank Bill, and with this vote a resolution 
was enacted stating that the Bill passed, and should be sent to the House.111 
The objectors wanted to limit the power of the Bank, but did not raise 
concerns about the Bank’s constitutionality.  The objectors included two 
framers, Few and Butler.  Their objections were noted by Senator William 
Maclay of Pennsylvania, who later published a diary of his service in the First 
Senate.112  His diary included only a few brief lines regarding the discussion 
of the Bank Bill.  He noted that Izard, Butler, and Monroe, along with one 
other member whose name was illegible in the diary but was probably either 
Few or Hawkins based on their recorded votes, opposed the Bank Bill.113  In 
the diary entry of January 11, Maclay said: “The ostensible object held out 
by Butler & Izard were that the publick should have all the advantages of the 
Bank.  But they showed no foundation for this.”114 
There was no recorded discussion in the Senate over whether Congress 
had the authority to charter a bank.  We cannot get into the heads of the 
members, but based on the subsequent debate in the House, can assume that 
they simply believed that Congress had this power.  This lack of debate over 
the constitutionality of the Bank was noted during the debate in the House.115 
There were twenty-six Senators in the First Congress, and ten were 
framers.  Not a single one questioned the constitutionality of the Bank.  The 
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eight framers who supported the bank were Richard Bassett and George Read 
of Delaware, Oliver Ellsworth and William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, 
Rufus King and Caleb Strong of Massachusetts, John Langdon of New 
Hampshire, and Robert Morris of Pennsylvania.116  The two framers who 
opposed the Bank were Pierce Butler of South Carolina and William Few of 
Georgia.117  They clearly disapproved of the Bank, but never questioned 
whether Congress had the authority to create a bank.  Chart 1 in the appendix 
shows the Senators and their status as Framer and position on the Bank Bill.      
B.  The House Considers the Bank Bill  
The House received the Bank Bill on January 21, 1791, but did not take 
it up in detail until the third reading on February 1, 1791.118  After the third 
reading, William Smith of South Carolina rose to complain that there had 
been no opportunity to debate the Bill, and moved to send the Bill back to 
committee.119  This was the first sign of opposition in the House, but the 
floodgates opened.  James Jackson of Georgia agreed and said he opposed 
the Bill entirely.120  Jackson was a planter, lawyer, and former state legislator, 
but had not participated in either the Constitutional Convention, or the 
Georgia ratifying convention.121  He said that a bank would only benefit the 
mercantile interests on the northern states and would particularly harm 
farmers.122  He said that there was already a “National” bank—the Bank of 
North America—which had been chartered by the Congress of the 
Confederation.123  He also noted that Congress did not have the power to 
grant a monopoly to one bank, and cited the Federalists No. 23 and No. 44 
to that end.124  He did not, at this point, argue that Congress lacked the 
authority to charter a bank. 
John Laurance of New York, a chief supporter of the Bank, rose to 
defend the Bill.125  Laurance was a lawyer and former state legislator but had 
not been part of the Constitutional Convention or his state’s ratifying 
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convention.126  He said that the government had the power to borrow money, 
and that under the Articles of Confederation the Bank of North America had 
been chartered to facilitate this.127  He said that the new federal government 
“is vested with powers equal to those of the late confederation,”128 and 
therefore must have this power.  
Debate over the Bank Bill occupied the House for the next week.  On 
February 2, James Madison made his first detailed analysis of the Bank and 
the question of constitutionality.129  He was opposed to the Bank, but began 
with a description of the advantages and disadvantages of a bank, and noted 
that there were many advantages.130  Despite the advantages, however, he 
said that he did not believe Congress had the power to charter a bank.131  He 
noted that there had been a proposal during the Constitutional Convention to 
give Congress the power to grant charters, but that proposal had been 
rejected.132 
Madison was partially correct about the proposal during the 
Convention, though other framers would remember and describe the situation 
differently, as we shall see in a moment.  The record of the debate does not 
indicate whether it was removed because the delegates did not want to grant 
that power to Congress (Madison’s suggested view), or because they 
considered it a general power that the national government would inherently 
have, and therefore need not be set out in the Constitution (the position of the 
supporters of the Bank, see below.)133    
Madison said that the powers of the federal government were limited.134 
The government was not created by a general grant of power, but a grant of 
particular powers only, leaving most powers in the hands of the states or “the 
people.”135  Because of this, Madison said he could find no power to 
incorporate a bank in (1) the power to lay and collect taxes to pay debts, (2) 
the power to borrow money, (3) the power to pass laws necessary and proper 
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to carry into execution those powers, or (4) the power to promote the general 
welfare in the preamble.136  
He said that if the national government could charter a bank it would 
interfere with the power of the states to incorporate banks, or more 
importantly to prohibit the incorporation of banks.137  If Congress could 
incorporate a bank it could conceivably incorporate anything, including a 
state religion.138  He distinguished this from the Bank of North America, 
which he called “a child of necessity,” and asserted that it exceeded the 
powers granted under the Articles of Confederation, as shown by the fact that 
the Congress of the Confederation had requested that the states also 
incorporate the Bank.139  
Next, Madison discussed whether the Bank could be allowed under the 
“necessary and proper” clause, either alone or in conjunction with 
enumerated powers.140 He said the meaning of this clause must  
according to the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context, be 
limited to means necessary to the end, and incidental to the nature of the 
specific powers . . . . In this sense it had been explained by the friends of 
the constitution, and ratified by the state conventions.141  
In other words, this provision only applied to specifically enumerated 
powers.  Madison continued:  
     The essential characteristic of the government, as composed of limited 
and enumerated powers, would be destroyed: if instead of direct and 
incidental means, any means could be used, which in the language of the 
preamble to the [Bank] bill, ‘might be conceived to be conductive to the 
successful conducting of the finances; or might be conceived to tend to give 
facility to the obtaining of loans.’ 
. . . . 
     [If Congress] by virtue of the power to borrow, can create the means of 
lending, and in pursuance of these means, can incorporate a Bank, they 
many do anything whatever creative of like means.142  
. . . . 
     The doctrine of implication is always a tender one . . . . Mark the 
reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends. To borrow money is 
made the end and the accumulation of capitals, implied as the means. The 
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accumulation of capitals is then the end, and a bank implied as the means. 
The bank is then the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital 
punishments, etc., implies the means. If implications, thus remote and thus 
multiplied, can be linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach 
every object of legislation, every object within the whole compass of 
political economy.143 
Madison said that the Constitution specifically sets out important 
powers, and leaves only the less important powers to implication.144 For 
example, Congress has the power to regulate money, and it is expressly 
granted the power to punish counterfeiters.145 It has the power to declare war, 
and then was expressly granted the power to raise an army.146   Madison 
wrote, “It is not pretended that every insertion or omission in the constitution 
is the effect of systematic attention. This is the not the character of any human 
work . . . .  Important powers are expressly asserted, not implied, and the 
creation of the bank is an important power.”147 
Madison distinguished between a power necessary and proper for the 
government, and a power necessary and proper for executing an enumerated 
power.148  In the later, the incidental “necessary” powers were not expressed, 
but drawn from the nature of each enumerated power.  In the former, the 
powers of the government were expressly enumerated.149  “This constituted 
the peculiar nature of the government, no power therefore not enumerated, 
could be inferred from the general nature of government.”150  
Madison said that the discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause in 
the state ratifying conventions had all turned on the same fundamental 
principle that the term “necessary and proper” gave no additional powers to 
those enumerated.151  He then read sections of the ratifying debates from 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina to support his contention.152 
Madison then read proposed limits on Federal power from the ratifying 
conventions, which eventually became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, 
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implying that these proposed limitations indicated a desire to limit the power 
of government.153  Then he summarized his arguments: 
It appears on the whole that the power exercised by the bill was condemned 
by the silence of the constitution; was condemned by the rule of 
interpretation arising out of the constitution; was condemned by its 
tendency to destroy the main characteristic of the constitution; was 
condemned by the expositions of the friends of the constitution . . . , was 
condemned by the apparent intention of the parties which ratified the 
constitution; was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by 
Congress themselves to the Constitution” and he hoped would be 
condemned now by Congress.154 
James Jackson agreed with Madison that nothing in the Constitution 
gave Congress the power to incorporate a bank, and the fact that the Congress 
of the Confederation chartered the Bank of North America was not applicable 
because that occurred during wartime.155  
William Giles of Virginia said that while a bank might be used to help 
borrow money, a bank was not necessary to achieve that purpose.156  Giles 
was a lawyer and had been a colonial legislator but had not participated in 
either the Constitutional Convention or his state ratifying convention.157  He 
also noted that the Constitution was ratified based on the proposition that the 
new government was one of limited powers, and if it could charter a bank it 
could do almost anything, thus obviating the idea of limited powers.158  
John Vining of Delaware said that he supported the Bank because of its 
obvious usefulness, and noted that the power to incorporate could be found 
in both express powers and those arising from necessary implication.159 
Vining was a merchant, a state legislator, and a state delegate to the Congress 
of the Confederation, but had not attended the Constitutional Convention or 
participated in his state’s ratifying convention.160  He said that the 
“Constitution was a dead letter if implied powers were not to be exercised.” 
He also noted that the old government had chartered a bank, and that the new 
government had power “more extensive that the old one possessed.”161 
Debate continued the next day with a side discussion regarding the 
financing of the Bank.  Some members wanted potential subscribers to be 
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able to use state bank notes to purchase shares of the National Bank, but this 
proposal was rejected thirty-eight to twenty-one.162  This debate over 
substantive provisions of the Bill, and the outcome of the vote, seemed to 
indicate a good deal of support for the Bank, even after Madison’s argument. 
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts was a leading sponsor of the Bank Bill. 
He was not a framer, but was a prominent lawyer in Massachusetts and a 
forceful advocate for ratification in the Massachusetts ratifying 
convention.163  In many ways his arguments were a mirror image of 
Madison’s.  Ames noted that Madison had always been an opponent of banks, 
including the Bank of North America chartered by the Congress of the 
Confederation.164  Ames expressed shock that he was only now hearing these 
constitutional objections to the Bank Bill.  “Why did he [Madison] suffer the 
Bill to pass the committee in silence?”165  He also expressed surprise that, in 
the weeks that the Bill had been before Congress, there had been no public 
complaint.  
It seems strange too that in our enlightened country, the public should have 
been involved in equal blindness. While the exercise of even the lawful 
powers of government is disputed, and a jealous eye is fixed on its 
proceedings, not a whisper has been heard against its authority to establish 
a bank.166  
This, and the public’s acceptance of the Bank of North America, was, for 
him, “sufficient proof of their opinion on the subject.”167  Ames admitted that 
the power to create a bank was not expressly granted by the Constitution, but 
said that Congress had added powers by implication, and virtually everything 
Congress has done since the beginning has been through some assumption of 
a broader power than that set out in the Constitution.168  
If Congress may not make laws conformably to the powers plainly implied, 
tho not expressed in the frame of the government, it is rather late in the day 
to adopt it as a principle of conduct: A great part of our two year’s labor is 
lost . . . for we have scarcely made a law in which we have not exercised 
our discretion with regard to the true intent of the constitution.169  
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He said that by the very nature of the government, the legislature had 
an implied power of using every means not positively prohibited by the 
Constitution, to execute the ends for which that government was 
constituted.170  “Every constitutional right should be so liberally constructed 
as to effect the public good.”171  
There “was as much danger in doing too little as in doing too much,” 
Ames said, and noted a number of recent matters where Congress addressed 
matters and used powers not expressly set out in the Constitution, including 
redeeming captives from Algeria and creating a land office to deal with land 
issues in the Northwest Territories.  “The power here was derived by 
implication, and was deduced from the reason and necessity of the case.”172 
Ames said that the “power of establishing banks . . . could be deduced from 
the same source:  From their utility in the ordinary operations of government, 
and their indispensible necessity in cases of sudden emergencies.”173  
Ames’s comment about the western land office was a reference to the 
establishment of a land office in the Northwest Territories (present day Ohio, 
Indiana, and Illinois) to manage the sale of government owned land.174  A 
number of other Congressmen referred to this Bill.  The implication was that 
if Congress lacked the power to charter a corporation, why had they done so 
for the land office in the Northwest Territories?  And, if certain members 
now believed that Congress lacked this power, why had they not objected 
then?  The objection, as Ames noted, is not to a corporate charter generally, 
but to a bank specifically.  
Ames said that this power to charter a bank would fall under the power 
to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money, and regulate for the general 
welfare.175  While these provisions do not specifically mention the creation 
of a bank, Ames said that “unless a reasonable latitude of construction of this 
part of the constitution was allowed he did not see upon what authority 
several acts of Congress would rest.”176  
Ames then said that while those opposed to the Bank complained about 
the assumption of powers by Congress,  
[D]o they mark out the limits of the power which they will leave to us, with 
more certainty than is done by advocates of the bank?  Their rules of 
interpretation by contemporaneous testimony, the debates of conventions, 
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and the doctrine of substantive and auxiliary powers, will be found obscure, 
and of course as formidable, as that which they condemn.  They only set up 
one construction against another.177  
Ames then described his broad understanding of the powers of Congress.  
Congress may do what is necessary to the end for which the constitution 
was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural rights of man, or to 
those which they have expressly reserved to themselves, or to the powers 
which are assigned to the states . . . That construction may be maintained to 
be a safe one which promotes the good of society, and the ends for which 
the government was adopted . . . .178  
Ames said that he “had no desire to extend the powers granted by the 
constitution beyond the limits prescribed them,” but in those cases where 
there was doubt as to its meaning and intention, he thought it was his duty to 
consult his “conscience and judgment to solve them.”179  
Ames concluded by observing that “we had felt the disadvantages of 
the confederation—we adopted the constitution expecting to place the 
national affairs under a federal head . . . .”180  Presumably the purpose of this 
Constitution is to wield power a bit more broadly than the Confederation.181  
Debate continued the next day, February 4, with Theodore Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts, a supporter of the Bank.  Sedgwick had been a member of the 
Congress of the Confederation and the state legislature, and had taken an 
active role in ratification, but was not a framer.182  Sedgwick said that until a 
few days ago he had not questioned the constitutionality of the Bank Bill 
because he had never heard any argument against it.183  He also expressed 
surprise over Madison’s objection to the idea of implied powers broadening 
specific grants of enumerated power, because Madison had used the doctrine 
of implied powers to grant the president the power to remove subordinates 
from office.184  
Sedgwick was referring to a question that came up when Congress was 
debating the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs185 (which was 
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renamed the Department of State later than year186).  Madison had drafted the 
Bill creating the Department, and had included a provision stating that 
inferior officers could be removed by the President.187  William Smith of 
South Carolina objected, noting that the Constitution included a provision for 
the removal of government officers:  impeachment.188  This was discussed 
but rejected as unduly cumbersome.  Alexander White of Virginia said that 
the President could only appoint subordinate officers with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, and it stood to reason that the Senate should have the 
same authority regarding removal.189  White and others were concerned that 
Madison’s proposal would give the President far too much power, and a 
restriction on removal would prevent the President from usurping power.  In 
defense of his removal provision, Madison said that it would be unduly 
cumbersome for the President to have to go to congress to remove 
subordinates.  And besides, Madison said, where “the constitution was totally 
silent, Congress might use its discretion.”190  Sedgwick used Madison’s 
previous argument against him.   
Sedgwick said that without some degree of implied powers “the 
government would be so shackled, that it would be incapable of operating….  
It is universally agreed that wherever a power is delegated, for express 
purposes, all the known and usual means for the attainment of the objects 
expressed, are conceded also.”191  This was a paraphrase of Madison’s 
argument in Federalist No. 44.  Sedgwick, like most supporters of the Bank, 
noted that Congress was authorized to lay and collect taxes, to borrow 
money, to raise and support armies and navies, to regulate trade foreign and 
domestic, and to make all laws necessary and proper to carry these out.192  A 
bank would be very useful in carrying out those enumerated powers.  He then 
asked rhetorically if banks were not “the most useful engines to facilitate the 
collection of taxes, [and] borrowing money”?193  
Sedgwick said that in the Constitution the great ends of government 
were particularly enumerated, but all the means were not, nor could they all 
be pointed out, “without making the constitution a complete code of laws. 
Some discretionary power and reasonable latitude must be left to the 
judgment of the legislature.”194  Congress had the power to lay and collect 
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taxes, and the means were left to the honest and sober discretion of the 
legislature, and in its discretion a bank was what was needed.195  He reminded 
everyone that the Bank of North America had saved the nation from 
bankruptcy during the Revolution: “without its kind aid the wheels of 
government would have stopped and the dawn of freedom never have been 
followed by the sun-shine of liberty.”196  
John Laurance spoke again, and noted the lack of public comment or 
outcry against the Bank.  “The silence of the people on the subject now before 
the House is strongly presumptive that the measure of a bank is not 
considered by them as unconstitutional.”197  He also reiterated that the 
government under the Articles of Confederation had very limited powers, yet 
they chartered a bank, and the states had passed laws re-chartering the bank, 
not eliminating it.198  He said that he believed that the majority of the 
Congress of the Confederation did not believe that the Bank Act was 
unconstitutional, “but considered it warranted by a liberal construction of the 
powers with which they were entrusted.”199  He said that full power to 
“regulate the fiscal concerns of this union is a primary consideration in this 
government, and from hence it clearly follows, that it must possess the power 
to make every possible arrangement conducive to that great object.”200  He 
noted that one of the chief defects of the Confederation was its inability to 
deal with these sorts of situations.201  The preamble to the Constitution says 
that the purpose of the new government is to create a more perfect union, as 
compared to the imperfect union governed under the Articles of 
Confederation, and “to suppose that this government does not possess the 
power for which the constitution was adopted, involves the grossest 
absurdity.”202  
Laurance, like many others, said that the question of the President’s 
power to remove subordinate officers had not faced this question of 
constitutionality, and removal was at least as important as the Bank.  He also 
noted that a number of states203 had proposed constitutional amendments that 
would limit the ability of Congress to charter a commercial enterprise.  This, 
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he asserted, must mean that the ratifiers in those states must have believed 
that Congress currently had that power.204  
James Jackson said that he had initially raised the constitutional issue 
and wanted to defend his argument. He noted that there had been a few 
newspapers that had argued against the Bank (but the record does not indicate 
whether the criticism was based on constitutional concerns).205 He agreed 
with others that if this assumption of power beyond the enumerated scope of 
the Constitution was allowed, the national government “shall soon be in 
possession of all possible powers.”206 He said that while states could still 
charter their own banks, a national bank would “eclipse” state banks.207 He 
said that Congress did not have the power to create corporations, and cited 
the long history of hostility towards various types of corporations, including 
ecclesiastical corporations.208           
Jackson also asserted that a bank was not necessary at the moment 
because commerce was flourishing.209 If a bank was needed in the future, a 
future Congress could deal with the issue.210 Finally, he distinguished the 
establishment of the western land office by noting that the territorial property 
belonged to the nation, and the creation of a corporation in those territories 
did not “interfere with the rights of any of the respective States.”211  
Debate continued on February 5, with William Smith of South Carolina, 
the only Southerner to vocally support the Bank, noting that the Senate had 
passed the Bank Bill without raising any constitutional objections.212  He, 
like other Representatives, noted that Madison had a completely different 
constitutional argument regarding the question of the President’s power of 
removal.213  He also noted that fiscal matters “necessarily devolve on the 
general government, and . . . that every power resulting from the 
acknowledged right of Congress to control the finances . . . must be as 
necessarily implied, as in the case of the power of removability.”214  Because 
of this, the “power to establish a national bank must reside in Congress—for 
no individual State can exercise such power.”215  
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Michael Stone of Maryland was opposed to the Bank.  Stone was a 
lawyer, and though he was not a framer, as a state legislator had been 
involved in the ratification of the Constitution in Maryland.216  He noted that 
the split seemed to be geographic, with the southerners generally opposing 
the Bank, and the northerners generally supporting it.217  He said that the 
nation was united on the idea that “Congress ought not to exercise, by 
implication, powers not granted by the constitution,” and felt that if Congress 
started expanding on those powers now it would never stop.218  He said that 
if government could legislate for the “general welfare” under the Preamble, 
this “doctrine would make ours but a short constitution” consisting only of 
the Preamble.219  
He reiterated a number of the previous arguments against the Bank, then 
noted that some members said that “if we tie up the constitution too tight it 
will break; if we hamper it we cannot stir; if we do not admit the doctrine [or 
implied powers] we cannot legislate at all.”220  But, he said, if Congress could 
do these things for expediency, convenience, or fear of war or the unknown, 
then “Congress may then do anything.”221   
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey was a supporter of the Bank.  He was a 
lawyer and had been a member of the Congress of the Confederation, but had 
not been involved in either the Constitutional Convention or the ratification 
convention.222  He reiterated many of the prior arguments in support of the 
Bill but added that one problem with private banks was that they had limited 
duration because they were partnerships which terminated at the death of any 
partner, but a chartered bank corporation would have a perpetual existence.223 
But, he continued, “the real issue is whether Congress has the power to 
charter a bank?”224  He, like many bank supporters said that Congress had the 
power to lay taxes, pay debts, and borrow money,225 and “as the constitution 
had not specified the manner of borrowing, or from whom the loan was to be 
obtained, the supreme legislature of the union were at liberty, it was their 
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duty, to fix on the best mode of effecting the purposes of their 
appointment.”226   
He listed a number of previous cases where Congress acted beyond its 
expressly granted powers, including the western land office and the 
President’s power of removal, but he also mentioned that the Congress of the 
Confederation often exceeded its expressly enumerated powers in a number 
of instances, including by dealing directly with the British during the war.227 
Finally, and perhaps in an attempt to embarrass Madison, he read portions of 
Federalist No. 44, including this section: “Had the convention attempted a 
positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their 
other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest 
of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates.”228  Clearly 
Congressmen were no longer deferring to Madison on matters of the meaning 
of the Constitution.   
The House resumed debate on Monday, February 7, 1791. William 
Giles summarized and repeated a number of his and other opponents’ 
arguments,229 but added that the economy was currently “flourishing” 
without a bank, so he could see no need for one.230 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was the only framer to speak in 
support of the Bank Bill.  Gerry was an interesting case.  He had attended the 
Constitutional Convention and had been a vocal participant but was known 
for being blunt, argumentative, and thin skinned.231  He was generally 
supportive of a strong central government, but refused to sign the final 
version of the Constitution because it lacked a bill of rights, and in his view 
created a government that was not sufficiently representative of the people.232 
He was a leading opponent of ratification in the Massachusetts legislature 
because of his concerns about the lack of adequate representation, ambiguous 
legislative powers, and lack of clarity between legislative and executive 
powers.233  After the Constitution was ratified, he ran for Congress noting 
that he supported the general outlines of the Constitution and felt that the 
defects he raised could be corrected by amendments.234  Once elected, he 
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supported most of Hamilton’s economic programs and favored a strong 
central government.235         
Gerry began by noting that Madison “has long decided against the 
authority of Congress to establish a bank, and is therefore prejudiced against 
the measure.”236  He suggested that Madison’s “rules being made for the 
occasion, are the result of his interpretation, and not his interpretation of the 
rules.”237  Gerry disagreed with Madison’s suggestion that the Constitution 
should be interpreted based on the intent of the framers, and suggested that 
the rules of interpretation by Blackstone might be a better guide, because they 
were familiar to everyone and were commonly used to interpret laws and 
statutes.238  Blackstone, according to Gerry, said that the fairest and most 
rational method to determine the will of the legislature is “by signs the most 
natural and probable, and these signs are either the words, the context, the 
subject matter, the effect and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the 
law.”239  With respect to words, Blackstone observed that “they are generally 
understood in their usual and most ordinary signification.”240  Gerry said that 
the only word truly at issue was “necessary.”241  He said that the meaning of 
the word “varies according to the subject and circumstances.”242  For 
example, if there is not enough specie available in circulation it would be 
necessary for Congress to create paper money, but if there is enough specie 
then script is not necessary.243     
If the meaning is still in doubt, Blackstone advised looking at the 
context, and noted that in England the preamble of a law was often used to 
construe an act of parliament.244  Gerry read the Preamble and said that the 
“common defense and general welfare” are held up as “the primary objects 
of” the new Government.245  He said that preparation for defense involves 
preparing for emergencies, which necessitates the ability of government to 
obtain “a sufficient sum of money, which is justly denominated the sinews 
of war.”246  How is this to be achieved?  One solution was taxes, which are 
either “too slow in their operations” to deal with an emergency, or onerously 
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high to create a surplus for future needs.247  The only other option was 
through the ability to obtain loans.248  But what then?  “Are we to apply to 
the banks already established in the states for loans?”249  These may not be 
reliable, or the money not available.  “Are we to apply to foreign banks or 
individuals?”250  These are also not reliable, and could leave the nation 
beholden to hostile powers.  It “must be evident that a previous arrangement 
to aid loans in cases of emergency is necessary and proper in the general and 
popular use of the term, . . . and what previous arrangement can we make so 
proper as that of a national bank?”251  
Blackstone’s last rule was that “the most universal and effectual way of 
discovering the true meaning of a law when the words are dubious, is by 
considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the 
legislature to enact it.”252  Gerry asserted that the causes which produced the 
Constitution were “an imperfect union, want of public and private justice, 
internal commotions, a defenseless community, neglect of the public welfare 
and dangers to our liberties.”253  He said that these are set out in the Preamble, 
but are also known to the members of the House from “our own knowledge 
of the history of the times that preceded the establishment” of the 
Constitution.254  
If these weighty causes produced the constitution . . . shall we listen to 
assertions that these words [necessary and proper] have no meaning and 
that the new constitution has no more energy than the old?  Shall we thus 
unnerve the government, [and] leave the union, as it was under the 
confederation, defenseless [against enemies] and thus relinquish protection 
of its citizens? Or shall we, by a candid and liberal construction of the 
powers expressed in the constitution, promote the great and important 
objects thereof? . . . I shall without hesitation choose the latter and leave the 
people and the states to determine whether or not I am pursing their true 
interests.255  
Gerry noted that Madison “has urged the dangerous tendency of a 
liberal construction.  But which is most dangerous a liberal or a destructive 
interpretation?”256  Besides, he continued, “If it is enquired where we are to 
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drawn the line of a liberal construction, I would also enquire, where the line 
of restriction is to be drawn?”257  
Gerry also noted that Madison referred to the pending amendment that 
provided that the powers not delegated to Congress or prohibited to the states 
shall rest in the states, or the people.258  To this Gerry asked, what powers are 
delegated?259  Gerry raised the issue of removal.  “As the constitution is silent 
on this subject, the power mentioned, by the gentleman’s own reasoning, is 
vested in the states or the people.”260  The record does not indicate if he 
pressed the point, but his implication is obvious: it makes no sense that the 
power of removal would belong to the states or the people, since it would be 
cumbersomely difficult, if not impossible, for them to execute it.  Gerry does 
note that Madison “contended for an assumption of the power, and when 
assumed urged that it should be vested in the President,” despite the 
objections of “a respectable minority in both Houses” who thought the power 
should belong to “the President and the Senate,” like the power of 
appointment.261  “His rule of interpretation then, was therefore more liberal 
than it is now.”262  And giving assumed powers to the President could 
produce far more dangerous results.  “If we have this right in one instance, 
we may extend it to others and make him a despot.”263   
Next, Gerry addressed Madison’s assertion that the meaning of the 
terms can be determined “by the sense of the federal convention.”264  How, 
he asked, “is this to be obtained?”  Are “we to depend on the memory of the 
gentleman for a history of their debates and from thence to collect their 
sense?”265  This would be improper, Gerry suggested, “because the memories 
of different gentlemen would probably vary, as they have already done, with 
respect to” that history.266  And even if memories agreed, “the opinions of 
the individual members who debated are not to be considered as the opinions 
of the convention.  Indeed if they were, no motion was made in that 
convention, and therefore none could be rejected, for establishing a national 
bank.”267  He noted that Madison had mentioned the power to grant charters 
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and said that this “was a proposition . . . to enable Congress to erect 
commercial corporations which was and always ought to be negative.”268  
Gerry said that reference to the state ratifying conventions was even 
more suspect because the records were imperfect.269  He specifically noted 
that reports from some states were from only one side of the debate.270   There 
was a vigorous debate in all the states, and any one sided description clearly 
implies the wrong thing.  In addition, “the speech of one member is not to be 
considered as expressing the sense of a convention.”271  Such speeches were 
meant to sway, and were not even-tempered or analytical discussion of the 
subject.  The:  
union was at the time divided into two great parties, one of which feared the 
loss of the union, if the constitution was not ratified unconditionally, and 
the other the loss of our liberties, if it was.  The object on either side was so 
important, as perhaps to induce the parties to depart from candor, and to call 
in the aid of art, flattery, professions of friendship, promises of offices, and 
even good cheer, were recurred to . . . . Under such circumstances the 
opinions of great men ought not to be considered as authorities, and in many 
instances could not have been recognized by themselves.”272 
Gerry also noted that Madison read from The Federalist to support his view, 
but “this part of his performance I consider as political heresy.  His doctrine 
indeed, was calculated to lull the consciences of those who differed in 
opinion with him at that time, and having accomplished his object, he is 
probably desirous that it may die with the opposition itself.”273   
Gerry closed by reiterating a number of arguments made by others: the 
Congress of the Confederation chartered a bank and the states and people had 
not objected; a number of states proposed amendments prohibiting Congress 
from establishing commercial corporations, which indicated that they 
thought Congress had that power; and the Bill does not create a monopoly 
since it does not prevent states from chartering a bank.274  
John Vining again spoke in support of the Bill.  He noted that Madison 
said that this Bill conflicted with the sense of the Federal Convention, but 
pointed out that the members of the Senate who had been in attendance at the 
convention had raised none of Madison’s objections.275  This, he indicated, 
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would mean that they did not have the same sense of the Federal Convention 
as Madison.276  
Madison rose to give it one last try.  He said that the power to grant a 
bank charter is significant, and such an important power should be 
specifically enumerated and not implied or allowed under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.277  He said that a bank would certainly be useful for collecting 
taxes and borrowing money, but that did not mean it was necessary.278  He 
also denied that a national bank would play any role in regulating 
commerce.279  He reiterated his belief that the use of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause in this instance could give Congress unlimited powers in the 
future, and attempted to distinguish the cases of the western land office, the 
president’s power of removal, and the Confederation’s chartering of the Bank 
of North America, but was essentially repeating his and others previous 
arguments.280  
Gerry rose one more time to respond to Madison, but, according to the 
newspaper report, “the house discovering an impatience to have the main 
question put” he sat down.281  The Bill to Charter the First Bank of the United 
States was put to a vote.  The first question was whether the matter was ready 
to be voted on, and the House said yes thirty-eight to twenty.282  The Bill 
itself was then voted on, and passed thirty-nine to twenty.283  All who voted 
against it were from the South, except Jonathan Grout of Massachusetts.284 
Most of the votes for the Bank were from the North, except John Sevier and 
John Steele of North Carolina, William Smith of South Carolina, and Joshua 
Seney and William Smith of Maryland.285    
There were eight Framers in the House when the Bank Bill was voted 
on: five supported the Bank and three opposed it.286  Those framers who 
voted for the Bank Bill, and therefore voted in favor of a more expansive 
view of the powers of government, were George Clymer of Pennsylvania, 
Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, 
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Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, and Roger Sherman of Connecticut.287 
Those framers who voted against the Bank Bill, and therefore essentially 
supported Madison’s views of strictly limited powers of government, were 
Daniel Carroll of Maryland, James Madison of Virginia, and Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina.288  Of the framers who supported the Bill, 
only Gerry spoke at length, and of the framers who opposed the Bill, only 
Madison spoke at length.  And not only did they take different sides on the 
Bank Bill, but their recollections of the specific debates and general sense of 
the Constitutional Convention were quite different.    
Tallying up all the members of Congress, both House and Senate, of the 
eighteen framers present, thirteen supported the Bank and five opposed it. 
From the debate in the House we see that the framers clearly had different 
opinions on the powers of Congress and the issue of enumerated versus 
implied powers.  We also see that they were not swayed by the opinions of 
Madison as to Constitutional meaning, perhaps because it was clear that his 
views were not consistent or impartial, or perhaps because they had come 
away from the Constitutional Convention with a different understanding of 
its purpose and meaning.  
IV.  WASHINGTON REQUESTS ANALYSIS 
The House passed the Bank Bill on February 8, 1791, and sent it to 
President George Washington for his signature.  Washington was well aware 
of the debate in the House, and respected Madison and his views, so he felt 
he needed to fully address the question of constitutionality.289  He asked for 
the opinions of three of his main advisers, Attorney General William 
Randolph, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton.290  
A.  Attorney General Edmund Randolph Opposes the Bank 
Washington asked Attorney General Randolph for his views first. 
Opining on such matters was one of the duties proscribed to the Attorney 
General by the Judiciary Act of 1789.291  Randolph was a major participant 
in the Constitutional Convention.  He was one of the authors of, and the chief 
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spokesman for, the Virginia Plan.292  But Randolph had also been the author 
of the Bill to Create the Bank of North America in the Congress of the 
Confederation in 1781, and the author of a detailed committee report arguing 
the necessity of that bank.293  Despite that, Randolph, like most Southerners, 
opposed the Bank.  
Randolph delivered his opinion to the President on February 12, 1791. 
The opinion was in two parts, the first setting out Randolph’s Constitutional 
analysis, and the second his critique of the major arguments raised during the 
debate in the House.294  He began by noting that “if any part of the Bill does 
either encounter the Constitution or is not warranted by it, the clause of 
incorporation is the only one.”295  The power to create a corporation is not 
expressly given to Congress.  “If it can be exercised by them, it must be; 1st. 
because the nature of the federal government implies it; or 2d. because it is 
involved in some of the specified powers of legislation; or 3. because it is 
necessary and proper to carry into execution some of the specified 
powers.”296  
Randolph went through each point in order.  “To be implied in the 
nature of the federal government would beget a doctrine so indefinite, as to 
grasp every power.”297  This mirrors the opponents’ arguments in the House. 
He noted that it is not uncommon for government without a written 
constitution to operate in every area that the government sees fit.298  Where, 
however, the government is created by a written constitution, the question 
becomes the degree to which the government is bound by the document.  He 
noted the recent amendment reserving power to the states, to reflect the desire 
to limit the powers of Congress.299  Despite this, he asked whether “upon any 
principle of fair construction, the specified powers of legislation involve the 
power of granting charters of incorporation?”300  Since it is not expressed, 
can it be implied? He said no because “a constitution . . . is to be construed . . . 
with a closer adherence to the literal meaning.”  And here it cannot be found 
within the literal meaning of the Constitution.301  
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Next, he analyzed whether a bank charter can be allowed under other 
specifically enumerated powers, and looked at the four most commonly cited 
provisions, the power to tax, to borrow, to regulate commerce, and the 
general powers within the Preamble.302  
Randolph noted that the advocates of the Bill said that the ability to 
create a bank lies in “the power to lay & collect taxes . . . because it facilitates 
the payment of them.”303  He admitted that a bank might make laying and 
collecting taxes convenient, but there are certainly other ways to do it, so it 
is not necessary.304  The specific taxing powers, according to Randolph, 
include the power to (1) “ascertain the subject of taxation” (2) “declare the 
quantum of taxation” (3) “prescribe the mode of collection;” and (4) “ordain 
the manner of accounting for the taxes.”305  This does not include the power 
to create a bank, therefore Congress lacks that power.  
Second, Congress has the power to “borrow money on the credit of the 
United States.”306  A bank, according to its advocates, facilitates the 
“borrowing money; because it creates an ability to lend.”307  This includes 
the ability to (1) “stipulate a sum to be lent,” (2) determine whether “interest, 
or no interest to be paid,” and (3) determine “the time and manner of 
repayment, unless the loan be placed on an irredeemable fund.”308  Randolph 
did not find the power to lend in his list of powers appended to the power to 
borrow, so he concluded that Congress lacks the power to create a bank based 
on the power to borrow.    
Third, Congress has the “power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”309 In 
Randolph’s view, this must include the power to  
prohibit [foreign nations] or their commodities from our ports . . . [and] to 
imposed duties on them, where none existed before, or to increase existing 
duties on them, . . . to subject them to any species of custom house 
regulations, or to grant them any exemptions or privileges which policy may 
suggest.310  
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He then noted the various powers relating to dealing with Indian tribes 
and the property and territories of the United States.311  The advocates of a 
bank said that it is necessary to regulate commerce, “because it increases the 
medium of circulation, and thus encourages activity [and] industry.”312  
Again this does not fall within Randolph’s list of powers, so he rejected the 
reasoning.  He noted that the  
Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of 
power . . . To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble 
if it be operative is a full constitution of itself, and the body of the 
Constitution is useless; but that it is declarative only of the views of the 
convention, which they supposed would be best fulfilled by the powers 
delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of preambles.313  
This also mirrors comments made by Representative Stone and others in the 
Congressional debates.  Randolph noted that while the Bank might not be 
allowed under each asserted power: 
[I]n truth, the serious alarm is in the concentered force of these sentiments. 
If the laying and collecting of taxes brings with it every thing which, in the 
opinion of Congress, may facilitate the payment of taxes; . . . if to regulate 
commerce is to range in the boundless mazes of projects for the apparently 
best scheme to invite from abroad, or to diffuse at home, the precious 
metals; if to dispose of or to regulate property of the United States, is to 
incorporate a bank, that stock may be subscribed to it by them, it may 
without exaggeration be affirmed that a similar construction on every 
specified federal power, will stretch the arm of Congress into the whole 
circle of state legislation.314  
Finally, he looked at whether chartering a bank can fall under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  “To be necessary is to be incidental, or in 
other words may be denominated the natural means of executing a power. 
The phrase, ‘and proper,’ if it has any meaning, does not enlarge the powers 
of Congress, but rather restricts them.”315  Randolph concluded with his 
general determination that “[i]n every aspect therefore under which the 
attorney general can view the act, so far as it incorporates the Bank, he is 
bound to declare his opinion to be against its constitutionality.”316  
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In the second portion of the opinion Randolph addressed some of the 
other arguments raised in the House debate.  He began by noting that some 
opponents of the Bill suggested “a rule of construction, adverse to the power 
of incorporation, springs out of the Constitution itself,” because “after the 
grant of certain powers to Congress, the Constitution, . . . specially grants 
several other [subsidiary] powers . . . .”317  For example, after granting 
Congress the power to regulate commerce, the Constitution also sets out the 
power to establish laws of bankruptcy, to set standards for weight and 
measure, and to establish post offices and post roads.318  But Randolph stated 
that this does not necessarily follow from what happened at the Convention319  
Whosoever will attentively inspect the Constitution will readily perceive 
the force of what is expressed in the letter of the convention, “That the 
Constitution was the result of a spirit of amity and mutual deference & 
concession.”  To argue, then, from its style or arrangement, as being 
logically exact, is perhaps a scheme of reasoning not absolutely precise.320  
Randolph explained, 
[t]hese similar powers, on which stress is laid, are either incidental or 
substantive . . . independent powers.  If they be incidental powers, and the 
conclusion be that, because some incidental powers are expressed, no others 
are admissible, it would not only be contrary to the common forms of 
construction, but would reduce the present Congress to the feebleness of the 
old one, which could exercise no powers not expressly delegated.321  
Randolph addressed Madison’s suggestion that constitutional 
interpretation should be based on deducing the intent of the framers, and 
found the idea without merit because the historical record is lacking.322 
“What may not be the consequence if an almost unknown history should 
govern the construction?”323  He then discussed whether the ratification 
debates could offer some insight, but found this equally implausible.324  He 
said that “these have no authoritative influence,” because it “ought . . . to be 
remembered that observations were uttered by the advocates of the 
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Constitution” to ensure ratification, and implies that the ratification debates 
are therefore not necessarily unbiased or reliable.325  
Finally, Randolph addressed the issues of the Western land office and 
the presidential power of removal. He noted the Constitution states that 
Congress has the power to regulate the territories and so could create the land 
office, but then concedes that on the question of removal, both sides have a 
point.326  But it was his opinion that Congress must have the power of 
removal, though he did not explain why.327 
B.  Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson Opposes the Bank 
Washington asked his Secretary of State for his opinion next.  Thomas 
Jefferson was the main author of the Declaration of Independence, and an 
important founder but was not involved in the Constitutional Convention.  He 
was the minister to France when the Constitution was drafted, and so had no 
direct involvement in its creation.  
1.  Jefferson Opposes the Bank 
Jefferson delivered his opinion to President Washington on February 
15, 1791.328  Jefferson began with a broad statement of his views on the 
nature of the government under the Constitution:  
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground: That 
“all powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.”329 
To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around 
the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, 
no longer susceptible of any definition.330  
Jefferson then turned to the Bank Bill.  “The incorporation of a bank, 
and the powers assumed by this Bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated 
to the United States, by the Constitution.”331  First, “they are not among the 
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powers specially enumerated.”332  He then set out and analyzed the 
constitutional provisions which the supporters suggest gives Congress the 
authority to create a bank.333  The first justification is the “power to lay taxes 
for the purpose of paying the debts of the United States,” but Jefferson noted 
“no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid.”334  He also noted that were this 
a “bill to raise money, its origination in the Senate would condemn it by the 
Constitution.”335  The second justification is the power to borrow money, but 
Jefferson noted “this bill neither borrows money nor ensures the borrowing 
it.  The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any other money holders, 
to lend or not to lend their money to the public.”336  The third justification is 
the Commerce Clause.  Jefferson said, 
[t]o erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who 
erects a bank, creates a subject of commerce in its bills; so does he who 
makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines; yet neither of 
these persons regulates commerce thereby . . . . Accordingly the bill does 
not propose the measure as a regulation of trade, but as “productive of 
considerable advantages to trade.”  Still less are these powers covered by 
any other of the special enumerations.337 
Jefferson next addressed whether a bank can be created under the taxing 
authority.  He analyzed what it meant to “lay taxes for the purpose of 
providing for the general welfare.”338  Jefferson said that the supporters’ 
reading of this phrase  
would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a 
Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United 
States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would 
be also a power to do whatever evil they please.339  
Finally he addressed whether a bank could be created under the powers 
granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause.  He said that the enumerated 
powers “can all be carried into execution without a bank.  A bank therefore 
is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.”340 
Jefferson noted that the proponents of the Bank said “that a bank will give 
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great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes.”341  This may be true, 
but  
the Constitution allows only the means which are ‘necessary,’ not those 
which are merely ‘convenient’ . . . . If such a latitude of construction be 
allowed to this phrase as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to 
everyone, for there is not one which ingenuity may not torture into a 
convenience in some instance or other, to some one of so long a list of 
enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and 
reduce the whole to one power, 
as set out under the Preamble.342  He concluded by stating, 
[i]t may be said that a bank whose bills would have a currency all over the 
States, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a 
single State. . . . But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that 
there exists anywhere a power to establish such a bank; or that the world 
may not go on very well without it.343 
2.  Jefferson and Constitutional Purity 
Jefferson was considered the founder of the concept of “strict 
construction” and he based his campaign for the Presidency in 1800 on the 
idea that the Federalists had strayed from the original meaning of the 
Constitution.344  Many historians have labeled the election of 1800 as the 
“Revolution of 1800,” because it so dramatically shifted the government 
from the Hamiltonian views held by the Federalists, to the views of limited 
government held by Jefferson and his allies.345  Despite this, it is important 
to remember that Jefferson’s idea of “strict construction” was somewhat 
situational, because he was willing to ignore the clear words of the 
Constitution when it suited his purposes.346  The most notable case involves 
the Louisiana Purchase.347  Jefferson knew that the Constitution did not 
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authorize him to take this action, yet he did it anyway.348  He explained this 
in a letter to John C. Breckinridge on August 12, 1803:   
The constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, 
still less for incorporating foreign nations into our Union.  The Executive in 
seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much advances the good of their 
country, have done an act beyond the Constitution. . . . It is the case of a 
guardian, investing the money of his ward in purchasing an important 
adjacent territory; & saying to him when of age, I did this for your good; I 
pretend to no right to bind you: you may disavow me, and I must get out of 
the scrape as I can: I thought it my duty to risk myself for you.349  
So Jefferson’s opinions on the meaning of, and fidelity to, the Constitution 
are, like Madison’s, situational.  
C.  Hamilton’s Response 
After receiving the opinions from Randolph and Jefferson, Washington 
asked his Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, for his opinion. 
Hamilton, as noted above, had been a driving force behind the call for the 
Constitutional Convention and had been a major participant in the 
Convention.  Washington gave Hamilton the reports from Randolph and 
Jefferson. Hamilton spent nearly a week working on the response, and as was 
his wont, he provided a voluminous analysis.   
Hamilton began by noting that he had drafted the original Bill, so his 
opinion might be suspect.350  He then jumped right in and addressed 
Randolph’s assertion that Congress does not have the power to create a 
corporation.351  Hamilton said, 
every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes 
. . . a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the 
attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by 
restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or 
not contrary to the essential ends of political society.352  
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He asserted “it is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect 
corporations.”353  He does not specifically articulate why, but we may assume 
that he is referring to the historic powers of government, because he goes on 
to assert that “where the authority of the government is general, it can create 
corporations in all cases, [but] where it is confined to certain branches of 
legislation, it can create corporations only in those cases.”354 
It is not denied that there are implied as well as express powers [in the 
Constitution], and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter.  
. . . [The] power of erecting a corporation may as well be . . . employed as 
an instrument or mean of carrying into execution any of the specified 
powers, as any other instrument or mean whatever.  The only question must 
be . . . whether the mean to be employed . . . has a natural relation to any of 
the acknowledged objects or lawful ends of the government.  Thus a 
corporation may . . . be erected in relation to the collection of taxes, or to 
the trade with foreign countries . . . because it is the province of the federal 
government to regulate those objects.355   
He disagreed with Jefferson’s definition of “necessary.”  Jefferson had 
stated “no means are to be considered as necessary but those without which 
the grant of the power would be nugatory.”356  Hamilton said that according 
to both the grammatical and popular sense,  
necessary often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful, 
or conducive to.  It is a common mode of expression to say, that it is 
necessary for a government or a person to do this or that thing, when nothing 
more is intended or understood, than that the interests of the government or 
person require, or will be promoted by, the doing of this or that thing.357  
He suggested that the words of the Necessary and Proper Clause make 
it clear “that it was the intent of the Convention . . . to give a liberal latitude 
to the exercise of the specified powers.”358  He suggested that it is as 
dangerous to read the Constitution literally (that is strictly) as it is to read the 
Constitution liberally (that is broadly).359  “The moment the literal meaning 
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is departed from, there is a chance of error and abuse.  And yet an adherence 
to the letter of its powers would at once arrest the motions of government.”360   
He suggested that the way to resolve this is to look separately at the 
ends, and the means of achieving those ends.361  “If the end be clearly 
comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have 
an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular 
provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the 
compass of the national authority.”362  This is a subtle restating of Madison’s 
argument in Federalist No. 44, which stated, “wherever the end is required, 
the means are authorized.”363  Hamilton suggested an additional criterion: 
“Does the proposed measure abridge a pre-existing right of any State or of 
any individual?”364  If not, then “there is a strong presumption in favor of its 
constitutionality.”365  And here, he noted, the Bill does not prevent the states 
from “erecting as many banks as they please.”366  
Hamilton concluded by stating that based on the forgoing analysis, “the 
power to erect corporations is not to be considered as an independent or 
substantive power, but as an incidental and auxiliary one, and was therefore 
more properly left to implication, than expressly granted.”367  Hamilton then 
explained that a bank is simply incidental to enumerated powers.368  “A bank 
relates to the collection of taxes in two ways indirectly, [1] by increasing the 
quantity of circulating medium and quickening circulation, which facilitates 
the means of paying directly, [2] by creating a convenient species of medium 
in which they are to be paid.”369  A bank is directly related to borrowing 
money, “because it is an usual, and in sudden emergencies an essential, 
instrument in the obtaining of loans to government.”370  A bank is important 
for raising money during wartime because it may take far too long to raise 
taxes or obtain loans from other countries.371  
The institution of a bank has also a natural relation to the regulation of trade 
between the States, in so far as it is conducive to the creation of a convenient 
medium of exchange between them, and to the keeping up a full circulation, 
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by preventing the frequent displacement of the metals in reciprocal 
remittances.  `Money is the very hinge on which commerce turns.372  
D.  Washington Signs the Bank Bill  
After reading and contemplating the three opinions, Washington signed 
the Bill that created the Bank of the United States on February 25, 1791.373 
Washington left no record of his reasoning, but we do know that he had been 
long concerned with the ability of the government to deal with commercial 
interests, including through his involvement with the Annapolis 
Convention.374 Washington was also the presiding officer at the 
Constitutional Convention, and so was undoubtedly familiar with the 
arguments made during the debate over the Constitution.  Based on that 
experience, and after reviewing the opinions supporting and opposing the 
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, George Washington 
essentially endorsed Hamilton’s expansive view on the powers of the 
national government.375 
V.  FRAMERS FOR AND FRAMERS AGAINST  
There were fifty-five men who attended the Constitutional Convention, 
though only thirty-eight signed the final document.376  Of those fifty-five 
men, twenty-one were in the first federal government, including President 
Washington, Treasury Secretary Hamilton, Attorney General Randolph, ten 
senators, and eight members of the House of Representatives.377  Of those 
twenty-one men, sixteen supported the Bank, and five opposed it.378  
The advocates of limited government like to quote Madison’s comment 
from Federalist No. 45, with the implication that this was somehow the 
consensus view of the Framers.  But the debate over the First Bank of the 
United States indicates that a majority of the framers did not support 
Madison’s views on limited government.379  Many actually seemed to favor 
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a larger and more active government.380  It should also be noted that many, 
as indicated above, did not share Madison’s view of constitutional 
interpretation, or his recollection of the events at the Constitutional 
Convention.381  
The Bank of the United States quickly became an important economic 
player in the new nation, and eventually was the largest single commercial 
enterprise in the country.382  So a majority of the “framers” created a 
government owned enterprise that was the largest commercial enterprise in 
the nation. This is hardly an endorsement of limited government.   
VI.  THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 
The charter for the First Bank of the United States ran until March 4, 
1811.  As it neared expiration, supporters began to discuss a new charter. 
James Madison was now President.  Madison had seen the impact of the Bank 
on the new nation, and while he still harbored doubts about its 
constitutionality, he could not doubt its effectiveness.383  But as the charter 
for the First Bank neared termination, Madison knew that he would be 
ridiculed if he endorsed its recharter, so he turned to his Treasury Secretary 
Albert Gallatin, to push the Bill.384    
The first bill to arrive at his desk to recharter the Bank contained what 
Madison considered to be significant defects, so he vetoed the Bill.385  But in 
his veto message to Congress he explained that he no longer challenged the 
constitutionality of the Bank:   
Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of the Legislature to 
establish an incorporated bank as being precluded in my judgment by 
repeated recognitions under varied circumstances of the validity of such an 
institution in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the 
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Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a 
concurrence of the general will of the nation, . . . 386 
Madison’s statement does not sound like a person who believed in strict 
construction or rigid application of the words of the Constitution.  Instead, 
Madison’s statement sounds like a person who believed that the Constitution 
was amenable to the times, a living document.  
Congress re-worked the Bank Bill and returned it to Madison’s desk.387  
This time Madison signed it, on April 10, 1816, without comment.388  
In the course of his public career, Madison embraced broad powers of 
the national government (under the Virginia plan), limited powers of 
government (in his opposition to the first Bank Bill), and in the end the 
concept of a living constitution (in his veto message on the Second Bank 
Bill).    
The constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States was 
challenged in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland.389  The case involved an 
attempt by the state of Maryland to tax bank notes not created by banks 
chartered in Maryland.390  The true purpose of the law was not to raise taxes, 
but rather to attack the Bank of the United States by burdening it with this 
tax.391  McCulloch was the director of the Baltimore branch of the bank, and 
when he refused to pay the tax, the state sued.392  The case wound its way 
through the courts and the Supreme Court eventually ruled in 1819.  Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s opinion essentially tracked Hamilton’s argument that 
Congressional powers must be broad enough to get the job done.  He noted 
that Congress did not have the express powers to charter a bank, but it had 
certain implied powers, and under the Necessary and Proper Clause it can 
use those implied powers to expand on enumerated powers.393   
Two points are notable about Chief Justice Marshall.  First, Marshall 
was a Federalist, and throughout his political and judicial career he supported 
a broad interpretation of the Constitution.  Second, Marshall was also a 
ratifier, having taken a leading role in ratification of the Constitution in 
Virginia.  So Marshall was familiar with the debates over the scope of the 
power of the federal government.394  And in making his decision, Marshall 
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had this knowledge, as well as the weight of the framers in the First Congress, 
on his side.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Conservative justices, as well as politicians and political commentators, 
seem to suggest that there was a well-defined consensus on the Framers’ 
understanding of the Constitution.  But as we have seen, at least two framers, 
Elbridge Gerry and Edmund Randolph, stated that this was simply not the 
case.  Conservative justices also like to quote Madison as if he were the oracle 
of Philadelphia, with intimate and encyclopedic knowledge of the framing of 
the Constitution.  But as we have also seen, Madison’s contemporaries did 
not hold him in quite that high regard.  Conservative justices also seem to 
imply that the consensus of the framers was that the government was to be 
limited and constrained to strictly enumerated powers.  The fight over the 
First Bank of the United States shows, in one neat package, that the historical 
record simply does not support any of these contentions.  
APPENDIX  
Chart 1.  The Members of the First Senate in 1790 
Name Framer/Ratifier/Position State 
Bassett, Richard Framer & Ratifier, Supported  Delaware 
Butler, Pierce Framer, not ratifier, Opposed  South Carolina 
Carroll, Charles Ratifier, supported Maryland 





Ellsworth, Oliver Framer & Ratifier, Supported Connecticut 
Elmer, Jonathan Neither, unknown New Jersey 
Few, William Framer & Ratifier, Opposed  Georgia 
Foster, Theodore Ratifier, supported Rhode Island 
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Gunn, James Ratifier   Georgia 
Hawkins, 
Benjamin 
Ratifier, Opposed  
North Carolina 
Henry, John Neither, but supported Maryland 
Izard, Ralph Neither, Opposed   South Carolina 
Johnson, William 
Samuel 
Framer & Ratifier, Supported 
Connecticut 
Johnston, Samuel Ratifier, supported North Carolina 
King, Rufus Framer & Ratifier, Supported Massachusetts  
Landon, John Framer & Ratifier, Supported New Hampshire 
Lee, Richard 
Henry 
Neither, believed to oppose  
Virginia 
Maclay, William Neither, supported Pennsylvania 
Monroe, James Ratifier, opposed Virginia 
Morris, Robert Framer, not ratifier, Supported Pennsylvania 
Read, George Framer, not ratifier, Supported Delaware 





Strong, Caleb Framer & Ratifier, Supported Massachusetts 
Wingate, Paine Neither, supported New Hampshire 
 
There were ten Framers were in the First Senate: Eight Supported the Bank, 
and Two Opposed. 
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Chart 2.  The Members of the First Congress in 1791.  




Ames, Fisher    Yes Massachusetts  
Ashe, John Baptista   No North Carolina  
Baldwin, Abraham   No Georgia  
Benson, Egbert  Yes New York 
Bloodworth, Timothy  No North Carolina 
Boudinot, Elias  Yes New Jersey 
Bourn, Benjamin  Yes Rhode Island 
Brown, John  No Virginia 
Burke, Aedanus  No South Carolina 
Cadwalader, Lambert  Yes New Jersey 
Carroll, Daniel Framer No Maryland 
Clymer, George Framer Yes Pennsylvania 
Coles, Isaac  ? Virginia 
Contee, Benjamin  No Maryland 
Fitzsimons, Thomas Framer Yes Pennsylvania 
Floyd, William  Yes New York 
Foster, Abiel  Yes New Hampshire 
Gale, George  No Maryland 








Giles, William  No Virginia 
Gilman, Nicholas Framer,  Yes New Hampshire 
Goodhue, Benjamin  Yes Massachusetts 
Griffin, Samuel  ? Virginia 
Grout, Jonathan  ? Massachusetts 
Hartley, Thomas  Yes Pennsylvania 
Hathorn, John  Yes New York 
Heister, Daniel, Jr.  Yes Pennsylvania 
Huger, Daniel  ? South Carolina 
Huntington, Benjamin  Yes Connecticut 
Jackson, James  No Georgia 
Laurence, John  Yes New York 
Lee, Richard Bland  No Virginia 
Leonard, George  Yes Massachusetts 
Livermore, Samuel  Yes New Hampshire 
Madison, James Jr. Framer  No Virginia 
Mathews, George  No Georgia 





Muhlenberg, Peter  Yes Pennsylvania 
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Page, John  ? Virginia 
Parker, Josiah  No Virginia 
Partridge, George  Yes Massachusetts 
Schureman, James  Yes New Jersey 
Scott, Thomas  Yes Pennsylvania 
Sedgwick, Theodore  Yes Massachusetts 
Seney, Joshua  Yes Maryland 
Sevier, John  Yes North Carolina 
Sherman, Roger Framer  Yes Connecticut 
Silvester, Peter  Yes New York 
Sinnickson, Thomas  Yes New Jersey 
Smith, William  Yes Maryland 
Smith William L.  Yes South Carolina 
Steele, John  Yes North Carolina 
Stone, Michael Jenifer  No Maryland 
Sturges, Jonathan  Yes Connecticut 
Sumter, Thomas  ? South Carolina 
Thatcher, George  Yes Massachusetts 
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Vining, John  Yes Delaware 
Wadsworth, Jeremiah  Yes Connecticut 
White, Alexander  No Virginia 
Williamson, Hugh Framer  No North Carolina 
Wynkoop, Henry  Yes Pennsylvania 
 
There were Eight Framers in the First Congress: Five Supported the Bank 
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Chart 3.  The Framers and Their Views on the Bank of the United States. 
State Later Service View on Bank 
Connecticut   
William Samuel Johnson Senate Support 




Delaware   
George Read Senate Support 
Gunning Bedford, Jr.   
John Dickinson   
Richard Bassett Senate Support 
Jacob Broom   
Georgia   
William Few Senate Opposed 
Abraham Baldwin   
William Houstoun*   
William L. Pierce*   
Maryland   
James McHenry   
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer   
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Daniel Carroll House Opposed 
Luther Martin*   
John F. Mercer*   
Massachusetts   
Nathaniel Gorham   
Rufus King Senate Support 
Elbridge Gerry* House Support 
Caleb Strong* Senate Support 
New Hampshire   
John Langdon Senate Support 
Nicholas Gilman House Support 
New Jersey   
William Livingston   
David Brearly (Brearley)   
William Paterson (Patterson)   
Jonathan Dayton   
William C. Houston*   
New York   
Alexander Hamilton Treasury 
Secretary 
Support 
John Lansing, Jr.*   
Robert Yates*   
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North Carolina   
William Blount   
Richard Dobbs Spaight   
Hugh Williamson House Opposed 
William R. Davie*   
Alexander Martin*   
Pennsylvania   
Benjamin Franklin   
Thomas Mifflin   
Robert Morris Senate Support 
George Clymer House Support 
Thomas Fitzsimons  House Support 
Jared Ingersoll   
James Wilson   
Gouverneur Morris   
South Carolina   




Charles Pinckney   
Pierce Butler Senate Opposed 
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Rhode Island   
Rhode Island did not send 
delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention. 
  
Virginia   
John Blair   
James Madison Jr. House Opposed 
George Washington President Supported 
George Mason*   
James McClurg*   
Edmund J. Randolph* Attorney General Opposed  
George Wythe*   
 
There were fifty-five “framers” or delegates that attended the Constitutional 
Convention, of which thirty-eight actually signed the document. Those 
marked with an asterisk did not sign the Constitution. Of the framers, twenty-
one had a chance to directly weigh in on the question of the Bank of the 
United States, eighteen as members of the House or Senate, and three in the 
administration. Of those twenty-one, six clearly opposed the Bank, and by 
implication the more expansive idea of the powers of the national 
government, but fifteen supported the Bank, and by implication a broader 
view of the powers of the national government under the Constitution.  
 
 
 
